Introduction
As the investment fund industry has grown explosively, so too has the list of fund failure. One of the famous examples of hedge fund failure is the Long Term Capital Fund managed by the Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM).
1 In September 2006, another large hedge fund, Amaranth, reported losses of more than $6 billion apparently incurred in only one month, representing a negative return over that month of roughly 66 percent (Stulz, 2007) . A recent example is the Madoff scandal.
On December 11, 2008, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) charged
Bernie Madoff and his firm, Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC, with securities fraud for a $65 billion dollar Ponzi scheme.
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To better understand why investment funds, including both the hedge funds and mutual funds, fail and how these failures could be avoided, researchers attempt to predict the fraud and other operational risks in financial firms. Schwarz (2008, 2009 ) use a contemporaneous cross-section of hedge funds' Form ADV filings with a summary of historical violations to create a measure of operational risk based on the correlations between historically available hedge fund data and Form ADV variables. They then test if this measure is associated with hedge fund death, flows, and returns. Hedges IV (2005) concludes that the primary cause of fund's failure attributed to one of three categories of risk, investment risk, business risk, and operational risk.
Operational risks are associated with supporting the operating environment of the fund. The operating environment includes trade processing, accounting, administration, valuation, and reporting. These are the types of risks that investors do not intend to take as part of their investment strategy. For example, it could be the risk that an investment might be fraudulent, or that managers might misrepresent performance. The most common operational issues related to investment fund losses have been misrepresentation of fund investments, misappropriation of investor funds, unauthorized trading, and inadequate resources. The most significant operational issue is the misrepresentation of investments, which is defined as the act of creating or causing the generation of reports and valuations with false and misleading information. This may be due to deliberate deception or to operational errors.
It is widely believed that the internal fraud and operational risk are alleviated by selecting a good external auditor and larger and more prestigious auditors have greater incentives to monitor the firms closely. (DeAngelo, 1981; Shapiro, 1983 The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3 develops the hypotheses and models. Section 4 presents the data and empirical results. Conclusion is in the last section.
Literature Review
Early researches on the investment funds have centred on the performance persistence of investment funds 4 and the investor behaviour and cash flows to funds.
5
Operational risk and illegal behaviour by fund managers were ignored in these studies.
Several recent papers examine the returns manipulation of hedge fund manager and illegal behaviour conducted by mutual fund managers. Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2008) , and Pool (2008, 2009 ) present strong evidence that hedge funds' manipulate their reported returns. Zitzewitz (2006) shows that late trading in mutual funds was widespread. Goetzmann, Ivkovic, and Rouwenhorst (2001) develop pricing rules that prevent investors from late trading. Choi and Kahan (2007) and Houge and Wellman (2005) show that fund families that allowed late trading suffered significant outflows.
A number of other studies investigate the operational risk in lending institutions. The overall conclusion of these papers is that operational risk is a major source of risk for lending institutions and internal fraud is the largest component of operational risk. Chernobai, Jorion, and Yu (2009) It is widely believed that the internal fraud and operational risk can be alleviated by using a good external auditor and larger and more prestigious auditors 5 See Gruber (1996) and Zheng (1999) .
have greater incentives to monitor the firms. (DeAngelo, 1981; Shapiro, 1983 In addition to the choice of auditor, the association between earnings quality and large international accounting firms has also been investigated extensively.
DeAngelo (1981) documents that higher audit quality is associated with Big six auditors, where audit quality is defined as the joint probability of detecting and reporting material financial statement errors. Francis and Krishnan (1999) argue that investor may perceive Big 4 auditors as having higher quality because these auditors 6 Craswell (1988) studies the auditor selection in Australia. Firth and Smith (1992) and Beattie and Fearnley (1995) have more of the observable characteristics associated with quality, such as specialised training and peer reviews, than non-Big 4 auditors.
There is evidence that earnings of U.S. companies with Big 4 auditors are of higher quality and that the stock market values earnings surprises of Big 4 clients more highly than earnings surprises of firms with non-Big 4 auditors (Teoh and Wong, 1993; Krishnan, 2003) . Kinney and Martin (1994) analyse nine data sets of audit-related adjustments from more than 1,500 audits across 15 years, and conclude that audit-related adjustments are overwhelmingly negative on pre-audit net earnings and net assets. Another reason investors have greater confidence in the reported earnings of Big 4 clients is that Big 4 auditors are more likely to issue going concern warnings than non-Big 4 auditors for the same set of client circumstances (Francis and Krishnan, 2002) .
Hypotheses Development and Models

Auditor Selection
The first set of hypotheses (H1a Theoretical studies have shown that larger or more prestigious accounting firms have greater incentives not to perform a low-quality service at a high-quality price because they have more wealth (Dye, 1993) and more valuable reputations (DeAngelo, 1981 heavily on common stocks and the objective of this type of funds is long-term growth through capital appreciation. The other three categories include bond funds, money market funds and hybrid funds. These funds have a more diversified portfolio containing bonds, money market instruments and other assets. Kelley (1996) and Granzin (1999) compare the value and growth indices based on the behaviour of value and growth funds and report higher volatility of the funds investing heavily on the growth stocks. In the present study, I divide the open-end funds into two groups, stock funds and non-stock funds, which include bond funds, money market funds and hybrid funds. Non-stock funds have lower risk given the nature of the instruments they invested. In the light of the above discussion, I expect that the stock funds tend to select a local auditor because of the embedded risk in their investment portfolio. This hypothesis is formulated in the alternative form as: (Hung, 2000; Ball et al., 2003; Francis et al., 2003 , Leuz et al, 2003 Hope, 2003; Khurana and Raman, 2004; Barniv et al., 2005) . A more recent study by Francis and Wang (2008) investigates the joint effect of investor protection and Big 4 audits on earnings quality for a large sample of firms from 42 countries. They find that earnings quality increases for firms with Big 4 auditors when a country's investor protection regime gives stronger protection to investors. In the light of the above discussion, I expect that the open-end funds audited by Big 4 firm offer higher return to the investors because of investor protection associated with the high-quality audits.
This hypothesis is formulated in the alternative form as:
H1e: An open-end fund being a Big 4 firm's client tend to provide higher return to the investors.
Following Krishnan (2005) and Francis and Wang (2008) Therefore it is not a surprise that the mean of market return is nearly 69%. Notes: The standard errors are estimated using quasi-maximum likelihood (Huber/White) method. Parameter estimates are obtained using quadratic hill-climbing algorithm. ***, **, * stand for 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. The unit of ASSET is 1 billion RMB. The investor protection analysis is reported in Table 5 . The model (2) Note: The heteroskedasticity consistent covariances are estimated using Newey-West method. ***, **, * stand for 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively.
Data and Results
My
Concluding Remarks
In recent years, the Chinese investment funds market has emerged as one of the fastest growing emerging markets in the world. The investment funds, especially the open-end funds, are becoming the major institutional investors in China's stock and bond markets. There are a few systematic studies, however, on the operational risk, fund performance and investor protection on the investment funds in China.
In this paper, I investigate the determinants of auditor selection using a sample of 
